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THE STORY OF KELLOGG CO. v. NATIONAL BISCUIT CO.:
BREAKFAST WITH BRANDEIS
Graeme B. Dinwoodie*
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.1 may be the Supreme Court’s most versatile and
influential trademark decision. Justice Brandeis’ ten-page opinion contained language that is now
at the core of the statutory test for whether a term should be unprotected because consumers
understand the term as the generic name for the product on which it is used. That same language
guides courts seeking to determine whether a mark has acquired the degree of consumer
understanding (“secondary meaning,” or “acquired distinctiveness”) necessary to support trademark
protection. Plaintiffs seeking to establish trademark rights in a product shape must demonstrate that
the shape in question is not “functional” according to a standard that has its roots in Kellogg. And
defendants seeking to parry claims that the design of their product is confusingly similar to the
design of a once-patented product habitually invoke Kellogg to support a competitor’s right to copy
the subject matter of an expired patent.
These issues cover the waterfront of modern trademark law. As a result, Kellogg had a direct
impact on the structure of the Lanham Act, it has been cited in numerous recent Supreme Court
trademark opinions, and is a routine starting point for analysis in trademark opinions of lower courts.
The opinion is regularly invoked by scholars seeking to understand the theoretical underpinnings of
intellectual property and to shape the development of trademark law. By any objective measure, the
Kellogg opinion is a trademark classic.
The scope of Kellogg’s influence might, at first blush, seem surprising. The Court was
confronted by a relatively narrow issue of trademark and unfair competition law, and to a large
extent was revisiting an issue it had decided forty years earlier.2 The Court’s opinion, addressing
whether the National Biscuit Company (“NBC” or “Nabisco”) could, after the expiry or invalidation
of its patents on the SHREDDED WHEAT biscuit, use trademark and unfair competition law to
prevent a rival manufacturer (Kellogg) from selling goods of the same shape under the same name,
was also quite short. To fully understand its significance, one must be aware of the full range of
philosophical reasons that motivated Justice Brandeis, including opposition to broad intellectual
property rights, a concern for competition, and support for a misrepresentation-based model of unfair
competition law. But one must also delve into the intense commercial rivalry in the cereal
industry–a rivalry conducted by an odd mix of evangelists armed with even odder theories about
nutrition and health.
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See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U .S. 169 (1896).
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I. The Cereal Wars and Intellectual Property Law
Today, ready-to-eat breakfast cereals are a staple of the American diet. Dietary advice,
dispensed by the government and lifestyle gurus alike, emphasizes the importance of healthy and
sustaining morning meals. In a country where time is money and health is business, the delivery of
matinal sustenance efficiently is highly-prized. In the mid-nineteenth century, the American
breakfast was not radically different from the American dinner, heavy on meat and light on grains
and fiber. The development of breakfast cereals as an alternative morning meal was in part driven
by health concerns. More precisely, the origins of breakfast cereal lie in the efforts of nineteenth
century evangelical crusaders.
The first cold breakfast cereal developed in the United States was Granula, which “consisted
of heavy nuggets made from bran, the outer husk of a grain that is removed when making flour.”3
Granula was launched in 1863 by James C. Jackson. Jackson was a disciple of Sylvester Graham,
who argued that most health problems could be traced to masturbation. Eventually, Jackson saw
good diet (apparently involving ingestion of large quantities of whole grains) as a means of
moderating sexual desire.4 Although he was able to serve Granula to the captive residents at his
sanitarium in Dansville, New York, Granula required overnight soaking in order to be edible. A
market gap (even perhaps outside sanitariums) clearly existed for a tasty, nutritious product that was
ready-to-eat.
Several entrepreneurs sought to fill that gap. One of the most notable was John Harvey
Kellogg, a doctor and writer, who became superintendent and physician of the Battle Creek
Sanitarium health resort in Michigan in 1876. The Sanitarium, previously the Western Health
Reform Institute of Battle Creek, had been formed by the religious sect, the Seventh Day Adventists,
in 1866. Like Jackson, Kellogg was heavily influenced by Graham. And like Jackson (and
Kellogg’s predecessor at the Institute, Ellen White),5 he saw masturbation as a central health
problem, which could be solved by proper attention to diet.6
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The History of Cereal, at www.fitnessandfreebies.com/health/cerealhtm l (visited Jan. 19 , 200 5); see also
G E R AL D C A R SO N , C ORNFLAKE C RUSADE 66-67 (1957).
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The Institute was initially headed by Ellen White, who had visited Jackson’s Da nville institution. Mrs. W hite
had written a b ook on the subject of ma sturbation in 1866 . See id.
6

See J O H N H A R V EY K ELLOGG , P L AIN F ACTS FOR O L D A N D Y O U N G : E MBRACING THE N ATU RA L H IS T O RY A N D
H YGIENE O F O RGANIC L IFE (Burlington, Iowa, 1891), available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/Kel
Plai.htm l. (See Chapters 11-15, on “Treatment for Self-Abuse and its Effects”: “A Chapter for Boys”, “A Chapter for
Young Men,” a “Short Chapter for Old M en” and a “Chapter for Girls”). Among his “One Hundred C hoice Health
Though ts,” Kellogg warned against the influence of “quacks.” See id. at 625 (“QUACKS thrive upon the ignorance and
gullibility of the people. The only remedy for quackery lies in the education of the people in those medical facts and
theories, which will lead them to see that there is a scientific foundation for rational medical practice”).
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Kellogg’s first dietary product was a “mixture of oatmeal and corn meal, baked into biscuits,
then ground into bits.”7 Initially, he called this concoction GRANULA (the name of the product
developed by Jackson), but after the use of this term was challenged in a lawsuit, Kellogg changed
the name of the product to GRANOLA.8 Several years later, after Kellogg had experimented with
various health-conscious products,9 a friend showed him shredded wheat biscuits that she had been
sent for digestive trouble.10 Initially, Kellogg found them tasteless, commenting that they were like
“eating a whisk broom.”11 However, this exposure sowed the seeds of the dispute that eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court.
Another evangelical crusader-cum-budding cereal magnate was C.W. Post.12 Post spent time
at the Battle Creek sanitarium to cure his upset stomach. While there he became a devotee of
Christian Science. After leaving Battle Creek, he began work on cereals of his own, the most
successful of which was GRAPE NUTS. Initially, this product was advertised as an alternative
treatment for an inflamed appendix, and Post also claimed that it could cure malaria and loose
teeth.13 The advertising for GRAPE NUTS (and every other Post product) emphasized the positive
health consequences of consuming the product, and this marketing strategy was mimicked by other
producers; a “full-scale health craze was underway.”14 Post supplied every purchaser of GRAPE
NUTS with a copy of his pamphlet The Road to Wellville, which espoused the power of positive
thinking. 15
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McLaren, supra note 4.
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See id.
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These included TO AST ED CO RN FLA KE S. See Kellogg Toa sted Corn Flake Co.v. Quaker Oats Co., 235
F. 657 (6 th Cir. 1916).
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See C A R SO N , supra note 3, at 120.
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See McLaren, supra note 4.
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Ironically, the company that Post formed obtained ownership of the NABISCO SHREDDED W HEA T brand
in 1993, exactly one hundred years after H enry P erky had introduced the original prod uct. See Shredded W heat History
and Chronology, http://members.aol.com/_ht_a/jwalton971/history.htm (visited Jan. 18, 2005). Post, which is now
owned by Kraft, adve rtises its product as THE OR IGINA L SH RE DD ED W HE AT on its pa ckaging. See
http://products.peapod.com/1661.html (visited Jan. 24 , 200 5); cf. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321
F.2d 577, 581 (2d. Cir. 1963). In 1994, Kraft applied to register the term THE ORIGINAL SHREDDED W HEAT (with
the term “Shredded Wheat” disclaimed) with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but the application was abandoned
in 1997. See Trademark Application, Serial No. 74594623, filed Nov. 3, 1994.
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See McLaren, supra note 4 .
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See C A R SO N , supra note 3, at 154. The B attle Creek sanitarium was the setting for a novel (and movie) that
highlighted Kellogg’s practices. See T.C. B OY LE , T HE R OAD T O W ELLVILLE (1993); Alan Parker (Director), The Road
to We llville (1994).
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Today, the leading breakfast cereals are differentiated from each other in a number of ways
that reflect contemporary branding practices (facilitated by modern trademark and publicity rights
law). Thus, many of the leading cereals can be identified by their licensed use of cartoon characters
on the cereal boxes, or their endorsement by sporting heroes and celebrities. For those less
susceptible to the allure of cartoon characters and celebrity, private label branding has provided
alternatives, vouched for by mass-market house marks. In the late nineteenth century, claims and
connotations of health drove the brand. To be sure, nutritional claims are extremely important in
modern marketing, but in the late nineteenth century they represented the marketing strategy.16
The shredded wheat biscuit that John Kellogg had tasted, without satisfaction, had been
manufactured and distributed by Henry Perky. Perky, who developed the process for making the
biscuits, introduced the product to the market in 1893, and was issued utility patents two years later
on both the product and the machinery involved in making the biscuits.17 Initially, Perky intended
to sell the machines, not the biscuits. Indeed, his first company was known as The Cereal Machine
Company. However, he did sell the biscuits, which were first marketed under the name
SHREDDED WHOLE WHEAT, and later SHREDDED WHEAT.18
Shredded wheat biscuits were composed of whole wheat that was subjected to a process of
boiling, drying, pressing, shredding and baking. The biscuits produced by this process typically were
pillow-shaped, bulging in the center and pressed to a thin point at either end.19 The biscuits were
normally consumed in the form in which they left the cereal box, without the need for cooking or
preparation by the consumer, after being partially submerged in a bowl of milk. The pillow shape
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Claims of nutrition (and convenience) have always dominated the marketing of breakfast cereals, perhaps
because of the roots of the product. See, e.g., 1947 Packaging for Nabsico Shredded Wheat, at AdClassix.com,
http://www.ad classix.com/a ds/47 nabisco.htm (“Yo u Start the Day OK W ith This Bo wl of Flavor and H earty W heat .
. .Delicious, Ready to Serve, Yet as Nourishing as a Hot Cereal”); 1945 Packaging for Nabsico Shredded W heat,
http://pages.tias.com/11382 /PictPage/192223 5937.html (“They’ll Hail This Hearty Breakfast”).
17

Perky also obtained a design patent on the pillow-shaped biscuit, although that was invalidated in 1908, one
year before it would have expired. Design patents are available to protect the no vel ornamental features of a useful
product that are original and nonobvious; they are no t availab le for design features that are dictated solely by functional
considera tions. See 35 U.S.C. § 171; see also Best Lock Co rp. v. Ilco Unican Co rp., 94 F.3d 1563 , 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (functionality bar).
18

The biscuits were proba bly sold under the nam e SH RE DD ED W HE AT starting around 190 8. See W ayne
Mattox, Antique Talk: Breakfast C ereal C ollectibles, at http://ww w.antiquetalk.com/column318b.htm; see also Kellogg,
305 U .S. at 113 (noting that “For many years, there was no attempt to use the term 'Shredded W heat' as a trade-mark”
and that “in 19 05 plaintiff's prede cessor . . . applied for registration of the words 'Shredded W hole Wheat' as a trademark.”)
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Quaker Oats did at one time in the mid-twentieth century sell round shredded wheat biscuits, called
MUF FETS . See http://theno stalgialeague.co m/treasures/b arber/barb er40 .html.
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arguably facilitated the integrity of the biscuit in shipping, 20 and enabled the biscuit to be ready to
eat (while absorbing an ideal amount of milk).21
Initially, consumers agreed with John Kellogg’s skeptical assessment of the biscuit’s taste:
critics at the World Fair in Chicago in 1893 described the biscuits as “shredded doormat.”22
Eventually, however, the biscuits were commercially successful (for no immediately apparent
reason). Although Perky died in 1908, the companies that he formed to produce the biscuits (the
Natural Food Company, which later became the Shredded Wheat Company) continued to be the
exclusive manufacturers of the biscuits through the expiration of the utility patents in 1912.
In 1912, the Kellogg Company, which had become an established cereal manufacturer under
the leadership of John Kellogg’s brother (Will Keith Kellogg), entered the wheat biscuit market, as
was contemplated by patent law. Upon the expiration of the patent, competitors were free to use the
technology covered and information disclosed by the patent. This was the consideration that the
public received in return for the patentee’s period of market exclusivity. As it happened, although
the biscuits that Kellogg produced were somewhat similar in form, they were manufactured by a
different process. But, after the Shredded Wheat Company (the successor to Perky’s company)
objected to Kellogg’s activities, Kellogg ceased manufacturing the biscuit in 1919 (though the cause
of the delay in raising an objection, and the nature of the settlement, is not clear).
As might have been expected by Kellogg’s immediate entry into the market upon expiry of
the Perky patents in 1912 (and perhaps also by John Kellogg’s earlier cavalier approach to
appropriation of the GRANULA mark), it was not long before Kellogg and the Shredded Wheat
Company came into further conflict. Kellogg resumed its manufacture of shredded wheat biscuits
briefly in 1922, and more seriously in 1927, this time copying both the shape and the manufacturing
process. It called its product a SHREDDED WHOLE WHEAT BISCUIT. This prompted another
lawsuit by the Shredded Wheat Company alleging unfair competition. Again, that suit was settled,
apparently on the basis that Kellogg would sell its biscuits instead under the mark KELLOGG’S
WHOLE WHEAT BISCUITS. The Shredded Wheat Company was acquired by the National
Biscuit Company in 1930, and two years later Nabisco brought yet another suit, which six years later
would reach the Supreme Court.
The case that went to the Supreme Court was not the only part of the battle between Nabisco
20

See Shredde d W heat C o. v. H ump hrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1918) (Ward, J., dissenting)
(“The form evidently tends to strengthen a product made out of such fragile material and the size is apparently the best
fitted for use as a breakfast food on a saucer.”)
21

See id. at 961 (patent stated that “in this form it is ready for foo d”); see also the exchange of email between
modern-day consumers regarding the qualities and challenges of a slightly different product sold in the United Kingdom,
WEETABIX, at http://schumann.cleveland.oh.us/weetabix.html (visited Jan. 21, 2005) (discussing “sogginess” and
“avoiding crumbs”); see also http://www.halfbakery.com/idea/Re-constructable_20Shreddies (discussing surface area
need ed to prevent sogginess).
22

E RIK L A R SO N , T HE D EVIL IN THE W HITE C IT Y 247 (20 03).
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and Kellogg that proceeded to litigation. The contest was an early example of what is now
increasingly common, namely a multinational dispute resolved by serial national adjudication. Thus,
the parties litigated the same trademark and unfair competition dispute in Canada and the United
States.23 In addition, in 1934, while the suit that went to the Supreme Court was pending, Kellogg
brought a civil antitrust claim against Nabisco, alleging among other things that the false assertion
of a trademark infringement claim by Nabisco amounted to attempted monopolization of the
business of selling shredded wheat biscuits.24 The claim also alleged duress to change the shape of
the biscuits, and slanderous statements made by Nabisco salesmen to dealers in the rival products.
Putting aside that a monopolization claim might have been hard to sustain because Kellogg
was at the time the country’s largest cereal manufacturer,25 the Second Circuit held that the mere
false assertion of an infringement claim was not a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The court
noted that a different result might pertain if Nabisco knew its marks were invalid (presumably under
some sort of sham exception to antitrust immunity) and thus, with some reluctance, permitted the
case to go to trial. However, the Second Circuit noted that “unless much more can be established
than the bringing of [an unfair competition suit by Nabisco] and that [such suit] is unlikely to
succeed, it would seem that the plaintiff should try out its rights there and not burden the courts with
an action that would, in any event, show no promise.”26 Kellogg took the hint, namely, that to
maintain the climate of competition it had to defend the trademark and unfair competition cause of
action that Nabisco had initiated.
II. The Kellogg Opinion
A.

The Central Issues

The issues presented in Kellogg were framed by two prior opinions: Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co., handed down by the Second Circuit, and the Court’s earlier opinion in
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. Although Cornell is a lower court decision, it was authored by
Learned Hand, a respected authority in intellectual property law, and reveals a long-standing strategy

23

See Canadian Shredded Wheat Co., Ltd. v. Kellogg Co. Of Canada, 1 [1938] All E.R. 618 (Priv y Council
1938) (Canada); see also Canadian Shredded Wheat Co., Ltd. v. K ellogg Co. Of Canad a, [19 39] S.C.R . 129 (Sup . Ct.
1939)(C anada).
24

See Kellogg C o. v. N ational Biscu it Co., 71 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1934). Retaliatory antitrust actions are not
entirely unusual when a former patentee seeks to assert trade dress rights against a competitor after expiry of the patent.
See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc, 532 U.S. 23 (2001 ).
25

Ironically, thirty-four years later, the Federal Trade Commission sought to require compulsory licensing of
Kellogg’s trademark on antitrust grounds. Such relief is now prohibited by international law, see Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), art. 21, and is a strategy that domestic law had in any event abandoned
since the 197 0s. See In re Bo rden, 92 F .T.C . 669 (1976), rev’d, 92 F.T.C. 807 (1978); Jack W alters & Sons Corp. v.
Mo rton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 6 98, 704 (7th Cir. 1984 ).
26

Kellogg, 71 F.2d at 666.
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of Nabisco (and its predecessor companies) to sue any rival (not just Kellogg) that distributed pillowshaped wheat biscuits.27 Although Cornell was decided twenty years prior to Kellogg, it arose after
the expiry of Nabisco’s patents, and thus Nabisco relied on trademark and unfair competition law
to restrain Cornell’s distribution.28
In the early twentieth-century, trademark rights were largely a creature of common law.
Registration schemes did exist, both at the federal and state level. But Congress, perhaps chastened
by the striking down of the federal trademark statute as unconstitutional in 1879,29 had restricted the
option of federal registration to what were called “technical trademarks,” that is, “arbitrary” terms
that bore no relation to the product they identified (e.g., IVORY for hand soap) or terms “coined”
for the purpose of acting as a trademark (e.g., CLOROX for bleach). Words that merely described
the qualities or characteristics of the product upon which they were used (e.g., EXTRA-STRONG
for pain killers) could not be registered. In contrast to arbitrary or coined terms, such “descriptive”
terms were thought unlikely to identify the source of a product (i.e., were unlikely to act as a
trademark). And according rights in descriptive terms to a single producer ran the risk that
competitors would be prevented from using language that accurately described their products, a risk
thought minimal where the producer had coined the term or had chosen an arbitrary term
semantically unconnected to the product upon which it was used.
Trademark law was, however, a species of the broader law of unfair competition.30 Unfair
competition law might provide redress against use of a confusingly similar mark where trademark
law proper did not. As a result, descriptive terms could be protected under principles of unfair
competition if they had acquired “secondary meaning,” that is, if the producer were able to show that
the consumer had in fact come to identify a product by the symbol in which rights were claimed.
This approach, grounded in a misrepresentation-based notion of unfair competition, imposed stricter
standards of proof of harm upon plaintiffs and left marks permanently open to the challenge of
descriptiveness. Such an approach ensured protection against unfair competition in two senses.
First, it prohibited acts of passing off that would deceive consumers and allow rivals to trade on the
goodwill of competitors. But, second, it also ensured that the putative mark owner did not receive
an unfair competitive advantage by securing exclusive rights in terms that were needed by others to
compete fairly in the marketplace. Unfair competition law looked both to prevent unfairness and

27

See Shredde d W heat C o. v. H ump hrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918). Indeed, around this time, other
leading players in the cereal industry were bring ing complaints based on alleged rights in the relatively descriptive names
by which they identified their p roducts. See Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co.v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657 (6 th Cir.
1916) (rejecting claims of rights in TOAST ED C ORN FLAK ES).
28

The Second C ircuit opinion in Co rnell did not address rights in the name SHR EDD ED W HEA T; only the
appearance of the biscuits (shape, color, and size) were at issue. The use of the term figures more significantly in the
opinion of the district court, which like wise found for the plaintiff. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell, 244
F. 508 (D. Co nn. 1917).
29

See The T rade-Mark C ases, 100 U.S. 82 (187 9).

30

See Hanover Star M illing Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1 916).
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to promote competition.
The shape or design of a product could be protected under similar principles of unfair
competition law, again upon proof of secondary meaning. In the Cornell case, Nabisco succeeded
in showing that the pillow-shape of the biscuits had acquired secondary meaning, based upon
uncontradicted testimony from jobbers, retailers, and consumers.31 This source identification
triggered the concerns of trademark and unfair competition law. The plaintiff had established an
interest that warranted protection. Ordinarily, this finding would have supported the award of an
injunction against the defendant’s continued distribution of any confusingly similar products. And
witnesses testified at trial that they had served or been served Cornell’s biscuit as “shredded wheat.”
However, according exclusive rights to use the shape of a product raises difficult questions
for trademark and unfair competition law because it may affect the capacity of competitors to make
a rival product. This concern is less acute with word marks. A product’s shape may be closely
connected to its utility. Typically, there are fewer ways to make a product work than there are words
by which to call the product.32 Thus, the threat of adverse effects on competition made courts
cautious before offering protection to product design, a concern reflected most directly (but not
solely) in the doctrine of functionality.
In Cornell, Learned Hand acknowledged the functionality doctrine and thus searched for a
remedy that did not take away the defendant’s right to compete.33 He stressed that “under the guise
of protecting against unfair competition, we must be jealous not to create perpetual monopolies.”34
The Second Circuit methodically surveyed the effect that changes in the appearance of the biscuit
would have on the ability of Cornell to compete in the marketplace for cereals.35 A change in
coloring would have made the biscuit taste repellant and “either terminate or hopelessly cripple any
competition between the parties.” Increasing the size of the biscuits would have affected how many
biscuits would fit in a standard dish, and decreasing the size would raise the defendant’s costs. Both
options were “too onerous” to impose upon the defendant.
31

See The Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 96 3 (“T he plaintiff has at least shown that the public has become
accustomed to regard its familiar wheat biscuit as emanating, if not from it by name, at least from a single, though
anonymous, make r, and the seco nd is as good for these purp oses as the first”). It did not matter to Judge Hand that some
of the association may have been as a resu lt of the exe rcise of the patent rights. See id.
32

See Graeme B. D inwoo die, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 I O W A
L. R EV . 611, 624-45 (19 99).
33

Although the articulatio n of a default right to compete may not have seemed notable at the time, it did come
only ten months before the Supreme Co urt endorsed a right against misappropriation in INS. See infra Part III.C.
34

The Shredded Wheat Co., 250 F. at 964.

35
The most cursory analysis is offered of the option of changing the “form” of the biscuit, with the court relying
upon the invalidated design patent to support its conclusion that the defendant should not be required to alter the “form”
of the biscuit. Indeed, even any limited relief could not “affect the design dedicated by the design patent.” Id. at 965.
This is the full extent of Judge H and’s express reliance on exp ired or invalidated patents.
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The court, in language that reflected the balancing of interests at the heart of its analysis,
concluded that it did “not see any possible change in the appearance of the biscuit itself which would
be of enough service to the plaintiff to justify imposition upon the defendant.”As a result, the pillow
shape was found to be functional and the court refused to enjoin Cornell from making pillow-shaped
biscuits or to force Cornell to change the shape of its biscuits. The court recognized that, in the final
analysis, if the “secondary meaning is bound up in elements of the appearance which cannot be
changed without cutting off the defendant’s substantial right to make and sell that kind of goods, the
plaintiff must suffer the confusion.”
In addition, however, the court considered the option of impressing a mark on the biscuit or
wrapping the biscuits in ways that contained a legend of source. In assessing whether such relief
would interfere with the defendant’s right to compete freely, Judge Hand emphasized that “the
question is always commercial.” On the record before the court, the “commercial possibilities” of
such marking or wrapping were not clear, despite the court spending time analyzing the effect of
marking or wrapping on costs, and determining whether a pre-baking marking would survive the
cooking process. However, a majority of the court placed the burden on the defendant to show that
marking the biscuits would “impose upon him a commercial handicap which will practically take
from him his free right to compete,” and thus required that Cornell impress a distinguishing mark
upon its biscuits.
Even in formulating this limited relief, the court was quite conscious that its remedy served,
in effect, to regulate the competition in the cereal market. Judge Hand refused to impose an
injunction with respect to direct consumer sales, because in that context the difference between the
markings on the cartons of the respective parties’ products was sufficient to offer differentiation.
Only biscuits which Cornell sold to “hotels, restaurants, lunch rooms, and guest houses” had to be
marked. Moreover, the court, taking into account that experience would be the surest evidence of
commercial possibilities, went so far as to impose a probationary period during which the defendant
would attempt to mark its products distinctly, with an invitation to return to the court if this mandate
proved commercially prohibitive.36
The facts and issues presented to the Court in Kellogg were very close to those considered
by the Second Circuit twenty years earlier in Cornell. The complaint was filed by Nabisco in federal
district court in Delaware and invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction. Nabisco complained about
several discrete aspects of Kellogg’s activities: (1) the use on the cereal box of a picture of a dish
containing two pillow-shaped biscuits submerged in milk; (2) the manufacture of the biscuit in the
same pillow shape as the Nabisco product; and (3) the use of the term SHREDDED WHEAT.

36

Id. at 964. Judge W ard filed a dissenting opinion in Cornell, concluding that the Shredded Wheat Comp any
was entitled to no relief whatsoeve r. He reached a different conclusion bec ause, in his assessment of the competing
interests of the parties, he gave little weight to the interests of the Shredded W heat C omp any; he thought that it sustained
close to no injury through Cornell’s use. In essence, Judge Ward d isagreed with Judge Hand concerning the magnitude
of Cornell’s interests.

9

Nabisco’s efforts to restrain use of the picture were grounded in trademark law,37 but the claims with
respect to rights in the pillow shape of the manufactured biscuits or the term SHREDDED WHEAT
were based upon an allegation of passing off in violation of common law principles of unfair
competition, because neither the shape nor the term was federally registered. Nabisco had previously
failed to obtain a federal registration for the somewhat similar term SHREDDED WHOLE WHEAT,
separate and apart from any packaging graphic, because the Patent and Trademark Office had
concluded that the term was descriptive.38 Any efforts to register SHREDDED WHEAT would
likely have met a similar response.
The central elements of the actions for trademark infringement and unfair competition were,
however, quite similar (although the owner of a registered trademark would encounter less stringent
evidentiary hurdles). Either action was predicated upon proof that the term or symbol for which
protection was sought was distinctive, meaning that the term identified the source of the product
upon which it was used and distinguished that product from those manufactured by others.
Distinctiveness was central to trademark and unfair competition law because unless a symbol was
distinctive of one producer its use by another would not give rise to the consumer confusion those
causes of action targeted. Absent distinctiveness, there existed no reason grounded in U.S.
trademark and unfair competition law to restrain competition by the defendant.
Modern case law, since Kellogg, has neatly articulated a spectrum of distinctiveness,
according to which marks can usefully be classified. Marks that are coined, arbitrary, or suggestive
are treated as inherently distinctive, and protectable without proof of secondary meaning.39
Descriptive terms are protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning. Generic terms, which
“refer, or ha[ve] come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is
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Nabisco owned a registered trademark on a picture of pillow-shaped biscuits submerged in milk in a dish.

38

See Natural Foods v. Williams, 30 App. D.C. 348 (C. App. D.C. 1908). T he Natural Foods Company applied
to register the term SHREDDED WH OLE W HEA T for its biscuits under the so-called “ten-year clause” found in the
Tradem ark Act of 1905. The application was opposed by W illiams, who claimed that the term was descriptive and that
the Natural Food Company had not been the exclusive user of that phrase for ten years prior to 1905, as required by the
pertinent provision of the 1905 statute. In particular, the phrase had been used by Williams and others who manufactured
and sold shredded whole wheat. The court sustained the opposition, and noted that the term was an accurate description
of the shredde d whe at food product made by W illiams and others. Altho ugh no single sentence in the Williams opinion
uneq uivocally stated that the term was descriptive of the products of The Natural Foods Company, that conclusion was
clearly implied. And the Kellogg Court certainly proceeded o n the basis that the term was descriptive of both W illiams’
and Nabisco ’s prod ucts. See 305 U.S. at 117.
39

Mo dern trademark law refers to these classes of mark as “inherently distinctive.” The category of “suggestive”
marks deve loped between the 19 05 statute (which, with one minor exception, barred federal registration of descriptive
terms, even with secondary meaning, prompting the creation of the “suggestive” category) and the Lanham Act in 1946
(which mad e the suggestive catego ry less som ewhat less significant, by permitting the registration of descriptive marks
that had acqu ired secondary m eaning ). See Abercromb ie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d C ir. 1976).
“A term is sugge stive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the
goods.” Stix Prods., Inc. v. United M erchants & Manufacturers Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 196 8).
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a species,”40 cannot be protected by trademark law.
Distinctiveness doctrine was somewhat similar at the time of the Kellogg litigation.
However, descriptive marks could not be registered in any event, and secondary meaning only
secured the producer protection under principles of unfair competition. As the action of the Patent
and Trademark Office in response to the earlier trademark application for SHREDDED WHOLE
WHEAT suggested, proving distinctiveness (both of the term SHREDDED WHEAT and the
similarly unregistered pillow shape) would require Nabisco to show secondary meaning.
However, distinctiveness was by no means the only issue that the Kellogg litigation would
raise. As seen in Cornell, when rights were claimed in product shapes under trademark or unfair
competition law, a plaintiff faced additional hurdles. In particular, where protection of a shape might
inhibit competition, the shape would be deemed “functional,” and hence unprotectable. Although
the concept of functionality has been more fully developed in modern law, early twentieth century
courts had already recognized the enhanced risk to competition associated with protection of product
designs, and the need to deny protection on this ground.
Judicial reluctance to protect product designs was especially emphatic where the product in
question had been the subject of an expired utility patent. As the Supreme Court had declared in
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. in 1896, “on the expiration of a patent . . . there passes to the
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent.”41
This was part of the bargain between the public and the patentee. In Singer, the leading
manufacturer of sewing machines sought to restrain a competitor from copying the shape of Singer
sewing machines. Singer had at one time owned patents on various parts of its sewing machines,
but those patents had expired. The Court refused to allow Singer effectively to extend the life of
those patents by asserting rights in the shape of the manufactured product based on principles of
unfair competition. This so-called “right to copy” the subject matter of an expired patent would, of
course, be an additional issue for Nabisco to confront because Perky had obtained, and Nabisco’s
predecessors had exploited, utility patents on both the pillow-shaped biscuit and the machine that
made the biscuit.
B.

The Kellogg Opinion

The District Court dismissed Nabisco’s suit on the grounds suggested by Singer and, to a
lesser extent, Cornell. It held that the term SHREDDED WHEAT described the products of both
the plaintiff and the defendant (i.e., that the term no longer pointed to a single source and thus had
become generic), and that upon expiration of the patent the name of the product made by the
patented invention passed, along with the product shape, into the public domain. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court and remanded the case directing the lower

40

Abercromb ie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d C ir. 1976).

41

163 U .S. 169, 185 (189 6).
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court to enjoin the use of the photograph, the use of the name, or the use of the shape in the
manufacture, distribution, or advertising of the product.
After procedural posturing by the parties to clarify the scope of the Third Circuit’s
instruction,42 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Brandeis,
it then reversed the Third Circuit.43 The Court refused to award Nabisco the relief that it sought
either with respect to the shape of manufacture or the term SHREDDED WHEAT. The majority
opinion was short (though not as short as the dissent) and its reasoning somewhat enigmatic. The
(several) grounds upon which the Court based its opinion were not surprising: lack of distinctiveness,
functionality, and the right to copy the subject matter of expired patents. But the centrality of each
ground to the Court’s conclusion, and their relationship to each other, was unclear.
1.
Protection of the Shape. The Court decided that the shape was unprotectable on three
different theories: that there was a right to copy it after the patent expired; that it was functional; and
that it was not distinctive. The Court first held that Nabisco could not enjoin the manufacture of
biscuits in the pillow-shape because to do so would interfere with the premise of patent law that once
a patent has expired the public has the right to practice that invention. The Court explained that
expiration of the patents meant that the pillow shape, upon which a patent had been granted, was
dedicated to the public. This ground of decision was not wholly surprising in light of Singer’s
recognition of the right to copy.
The Singer court had, however, attached a caveat to the “public’s right to copy,” namely, that
the competitor should label the machines so as to disclose the competitor as the source of
manufacture. The Kellogg Court endorsed that caveat, noting that despite the right to copy the
subject matter of the expired patent, there remained an “obligation resting upon Kellogg Company
. . . to identify its own product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.” Thus, the Court
conducted an assessment of the manner in which the defendant was exercising its right to copy (i.e.,
how the products were being packaged and labeled) to determine congruence with principles of
unfair competition: the Court stressed that “the question remains whether [the defendant] in
exercising its right to use the name ‘Shredded Wheat’ and the pillow-shaped biscuit, is doing so
fairly. Fairness requires that it be done in a manner which reasonably distinguishes its product from
that of plaintiff.”
The Court’s analysis of this question was unusually fact-intensive for a supreme court, and
not hugely unlike that conducted by Learned Hand in Cornell. It compared the size, form and color
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After the first appellate decision, the Supreme Co urt denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. See 302 U.S.
at 733. It was only after the lower courts clarified the scope of relief that the Supreme Court intervened.
43

The Supreme Court did not address whether the use of the “two biscuits in a dish” picture on the cereal box
constituted trademark infringement because the Court read the Third Circuit’s clarifying decree as enjoining the picture
only in connection with an injunction against manufacture in the pillow shape and use of the term SHREDDED WHEAT.
Nabisco had not sought Supreme Court review of whether the use of the picture independently constituted infringem ent.
See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122 n.6.
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of the cereal cartons in which each company sold its biscuits, and noted the use (and size and
prominence) of a house mark by Kellogg to differentiate its product. Indeed, the Court went so far
as to assess the post-sale market such as restaurants, in which (because the carton was not present)
the size and appearance of the competing biscuits themselves were crucial. Kellogg’s biscuit was
only two thirds of the size of Nabisco’s biscuit, and slightly different in appearance. Moreover,
because only 2½% of the Kellogg biscuits were sold to hotels and restaurants (where the carton
differentiation would be irrelevant), and within that market 98% were sold in a different “twobiscuit” carton that also bore the Kellogg name, the size of the market in which deception might
occur was “negligible.” In contrast to the Cornell court, Justice Brandeis (twenty years later)
declared that marking individual biscuits was not “commercially possible.” He emphasized that
Kellogg’s obligation was “not to insure that every purchaser will know it to be the maker but to use
every reasonable means to prevent confusion.” And, unlike the defendant in Singer, which had
failed to comply with the unfair competition-grounded caveat and had thus been subject to an
accounting of profits,44 Kellogg had made “every reasonable effort to distinguish its product” from
that of Nabisco.45
The court also denied protection for the pillow-shape on the ground that the shape was
functional, in that the “cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some
other form were substituted for the pillow shape.” Presumably, a different shape would have
required alteration of the (formerly-) patented machine or made the manufacturing process far more
expensive. Although Justice Brandeis never explained precisely which advantages of the shape of
the biscuit were so useful to rivals, the effect that the shape had on the integrity of the biscuit in
shipping, the rate at which a pillow-shaped biscuit absorbed milk, and the readiness of a biscuit of
that shape for consumption without cooking, might all have been relevant advantages. In addition,
because utility patents were granted only on aspects of products that are useful, the existence of the
patent on the shape and the machine necessarily spoke to the functionality of the design. However,
the Court did not expressly link the existence of the patent to its finding of functionality (let alone
use the contents of the patent to support its conclusion).46
The Court’s laconic attitude to articulating the reasons for its conclusion of functionality
stood in stark contrast to the detailed nature of the inquiry previously undertaken by Judge Learned
Hand in Cornell. However, like Brandeis in Kellogg, Hand never addressed the relevance of the
utility patent to the assessment of effects on competition that underlay the functionality doctrine.
His analysis reflected competitive concerns that sustained a conclusion of functionality quite apart

44

See 163 U.S. at 200-04.

45

The complete avoidance of any possible confusion would not be required given the right to use the term and
the pro duct shape . See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 121.
46
In the parallel Canadian litigation, the Privy Council reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court, but
toward the end of its opinion, the Privy Council explicitly noted that “the decision has be en reached without basing it
specifically upon the existence of patents which have expired.” [1938] 1 All E.R. at 633.
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from the existence of the utility patent.47
Finally, the Court also suggested that the pillow-shape had become generic, having become
“primarily associated with the article rather than a particular producer.” It did not act as a sourceidentifier and thus could not provide the basis for an injunction against Kellogg manufacturing
biscuits of that shape. This conclusion did not, however, deprive Nabisco of all protection under
broader principles of unfair competition law. Although Kellogg was “free to use the pillow-shaped
form, [this right was] subject . . . to the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that
of the plaintiff.” The Court concluded that Kellogg had marketed its product in ways that complied
with this obligation, and thus had satisfied the conditions attaching to the right to copy the pillowshaped form.48
2.
The term SHREDDED WHEAT. The Court denied protection to the term on the
grounds that the term was not distinctive and use of the term by Kellogg was essential if Kellogg was
effectively to exercise its right to copy the shape. On the question of distinctiveness of the term, the
Court held that the term was generic because it did not identify a single source for consumers.49 It
described a product type, rather than a single producer. In contrast, the Third Circuit opinion had
stated that in 1923 there was “no dispute” that the term SHREDDED WHEAT identified the
plaintiff’s biscuit.50 Indeed, twenty-seven states and several foreign countries had registered the term
as a trademark.51
To be sure, there was evidence that supported the Court’s conclusion: for years, the term had
47
Judge Hand’s opinion in Cornell differed from Kellogg in that he placed no weight on the expiry of the utility
patents, and thus on the right to copy the subject matter of expired patents (the first ground upon which Brandeis denied
protection for the pillow sh ape). Judg e Hand appeared more con cerne d with effects of protection on competition rather
than its effects on the right to copy. Indeed, he did not find it troublesome that whatever secondary meaning that had
been established in the shape might have been attributable to the prior patent monopo ly. To the extent that the p atents
in any way appeared to have influenced Judge H and, it was the invalidated design patent that was o f the greatest
significance with resp ect to protection of the shape. See Shredded Wheat, 250 F. at 964 ( noting that “as to form, the
plaintiff appears to us finally concluded by its own design patent . . . . [T]he plaintiff’s formal dedication of the design
is conclusive reason against any injunction based upon the exclusive right to that form.”). Judge Ward’s dissent based
the right of Cornell to copy explicitly on both competitiveness-based functionality concerns and the expired “product
and design patents.” Id. at 967.
48

See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120 -21. See sup ra text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing right to copy). The
section of the opinion in which the Court discussed the reasonableness of Kellogg’s efforts to differentiate its product
from that of Nabisco is not linked specifically to either the protection of shape or the term. It would appear to have been
a combined analysis of the caveats attached to b oth the “right to copy” a nd the “generic m ark” do ctrines.
49

See id. at 116 (noting that the term “Shredded W heat” “is the generic term of the article, which d escribes it
with a fair degree o f accuracy; and is the term by which the biscuit in pillow -shape d form is generally known by the
public.”)
50

See National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1937).

51

See id. at 152-53.
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not been used as a trademark; federal registration of a very similar term had been denied on the basis
that the term was descriptive; and, use of the term “shredded wheat” in various patent documents
appeared to have been otherwise than as a mark. But the Court never really tackled these empirical
questions in any detail. Nor did it explain why the Third Circuit’s conclusion was incorrect. The
Third Circuit had examined both whether the biscuit was comprised of shredded wheat (the Third
Circuit declined to characterize the process of producing slivers of wheat prior to baking as
“shredding”) and whether alternative terms were available to competitors.
A finding that the term SHREDDED WHEAT was generic should, under one reading of
trademark law, have terminated the Court’s inquiry. Generic terms were unprotected, and free to be
copied. As the Court noted, the existence of secondary meaning was beside the point once the term
was classified as generic. No evidence of plentiful sales or extensive advertising, typical evidence
pointing to secondary meaning, could alter the unprotectability of the term SHREDDED WHEAT.
Yet, after concluding that the term was generic, the Court rebutted efforts by Nabisco to suggest that
it had developed secondary meaning in the term SHREDDED WHEAT and thus should have been
entitled to protection at common law. In rejecting the argument that the term SHREDDED WHEAT
had acquired secondary meaning, the Court suggested that, to be protected, the source-identifying
meaning must not be “subordinate.” The Court accepted that “many people associate the product
. . . with the plaintiff’s factory,” but this was insufficient to sustain an argument for protection.
Instead, the plaintiff would have to have shown that the “primary significance of the term in the
minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer,” which the Court concluded
(without explanation) that Nabisco “ha[d] not done.” This conclusion, albeit unsupported in the
opinion, implicitly reflected the empirical reality of consumer association.
Perhaps the Court’s venture into secondary meaning might have been better understood if
the Court had prefaced its discussion with language to the effect that “even if the term SHREDDED
WHEAT is thought to be descriptive rather than generic, it is unprotectable because Nabisco has
failed to show secondary meaning.” Perhaps the Court’s discussion of the legal standard for proving
secondary meaning was indeed an attempt to engage with the contrary empirical assessments of
consumer association made by the Third Circuit.52 Or perhaps this was the Court offering an
alternative justification for placing the term SHREDDED WHEAT on the generic side of the
descriptive/generic line.
Each of these conjectures is, however, refuted by the language of the opinion, and in
particular the structure of the Court’s analysis. In the opinion, the Court’s discussion of secondary
meaning was detached from its initial discussion of distinctiveness (i.e., whether the term was the
generic name by which the public identified the product). An explanation of the second ground for
denial of protection to the term was interposed between them. The Court thus appeared to treat the
“secondary meaning” argument as a discrete basis upon which Nabisco sought relief, rather than a
consideration integral to the Court’s analysis of distinctiveness and its conclusion that the term

52

The Third Circuit had made som e reference in its distinctiveness analysis to some policy considerations that
were grounded in comp etition (e.g., available alternatives) as well as actual consumer association.
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SHREDDED WHEAT was generic.
Why did the Court offer a discrete analysis of secondary meaning? Perhaps the answer lies
in the complexities of the concept of “distinctiveness.”53 While much of Brandeis’ distinctiveness
analysis is couched in language of consumer association, there is throughout the opinion a strong
undercurrent of concern for competition. Yet, nominally, formulations of the concept of
“distinctiveness” focus on consumer association: do consumers see the term as a designation that
identifies goods of a single producer?54 The Kellogg Court’s discussion of secondary meaning was
at one with this (empirical) perspective of distinctiveness as a measure of consumer association,
focusing on “significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public.”55
However, in classifying a mark by the later-devised terms of “arbitrary,” “coined,”
“suggestive,” “descriptive,” or “generic” – that is, in situating the mark on the spectrum of
distinctiveness – judicial analysis is often conducted according to multiple metrics.56 In particular,
classification (which the Kellogg Court had earlier in its opinion cursorily performed, finding
SHREDDED WHEAT to be generic) is often explicitly viewed through two lenses: consumer
association, and effects on competition.57 For example, if a mark is one which “competitors would
be likely to need . . . in describing their products,” it is likely to be regarded as descriptive.58 If
conferring trademark rights on a term would accord the mark owner a monopoly over a product
market, that term will be found generic.59

53

In addition, the lesser remedy – and, thus, this additional analysis of secondary meaning – was contemplated
only because principles of unfair competition law might provide some relief in circumstances where trademark law
afforded no (prohibitory injunctive) remedy. The Supreme Court had stressed in the early twentieth century that
trademark law was a subset of the broader law of unfair comp etition. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403 (1916); cf. Two Pe sos, Inc. v. Taco C abana, Inc., 505 U.S. 73 (199 2) (Stevens J., concurring).
54

See, e.g., Resta tement (Third) of Unfair Compe tition § 1 3 (1995 ) (definition of “d istinctive”); see also 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of “trademark”); 15 U.S.C. § 1 064 (3) (“the prim ary significance o f the registered m ark to the
relevant public . . . shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods
or services on or in connection with which it has been used”).
55

The Court’s high standard for secondary meaning might, however, re flect a concern for competition (or even
the sanctity of the right to copy, which might be imperiled by easy de facto pa tent pro tection through the trademark
system).
56

Competition is not the only other policy that might be implicated. See Rochelle C oop er Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 N OTRE D AME L. R EV . 397, 418 (1990) (arguing that
the expressive value of certain trademarks should also lead to a finding of genericity regardless of competition questions).
57
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress,
75 N O R T H C AROLINA L. R EV . 471 , 503 -04 (1 997 ) (explaining the dual lenses thro ugh wh ich distinc tiveness is assessed).
58

Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smo kehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).

59

See, e.g., Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs., Inc., 198 F.3d 1 143 (9th Cir. 1999).
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It may be that, although competitive concerns warranted the Court classifying the term
SHREDDED WHEAT as generic, the term SHREDDED WHEAT was in some sense distinctive if
viewed empirically as a question of consumer association. Here, the opinion offered inconsistent
clues. Despite little supporting analysis, the Court had expressly grounded its finding that
SHREDDED WHEAT was generic on the fact that it was “the term by which the biscuit in pillowshaped form is generally known by the public.” Yet, the Court implicitly acknowledged that Nabisco
had made some showing of protectable meaning by requiring “that the defendant use reasonable care
to inform the public of the source of its product.” Absent some distinctiveness in fact (what courts
and commentators now call “de facto secondary meaning”), there would have been no reason under
then-prevailing U.S. law to contemplate granting Nabisco any relief,60 because no actionable
confusion would as a factual matter have been likely to ensue.61 Thus, the Court’s supposedly
empirical conclusion of genericity is partially belied by its contemplation of some lesser relief.
As a result of this ambiguity, fully understanding the Court’s discussion of secondary
meaning is difficult. The Court’s overall analysis of distinctiveness is stretched and conclusory
because it was seeking to sustain as an empirical conclusion what was in truth a legal policy choice
driven by concerns about competition. The opinion did not clearly explain whether the possibility
of a lesser remedy under unfair competition principles is triggered by some meaning to consumers
less than “primary significance” or instead simply by “primary significance” that the Court would
not recognize de iure for other reasons. Of course, the Court neatly avoided the ambiguity in the
case before it by finding that Kellogg had in any event fully met its obligation under unfair
competition law. But the ambiguity remained.
The suggestion that the Court acted on a rationale other than actual consumer understanding
of the term SHREDDED WHEAT was also reflected in the Court’s alternative explanation of the
unprotectability of the term, which could again be traced to Singer.62 This explanation was explicitly
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If the United S tates had an unfair com petition law that resem bled that found in the civil law countries of
Europe, relief might have b een available without this harm being involve d. Indeed, even under an expansive unfair
competition law that is limited to acts of misrepresentation, causes of action might exist in circumstances other than those
raising trademark-like issues (and hence not truly dependent upon d istinctiveness). The false advertising provision of
the Lanham Act can be viewe d in these terms, and so too could the “false designation of origin” provision (although the
Court’s recent Dastar decision may have limited the extent to which that provision affords relief beyond trademarkproper claims). W hether such protection would have been available at the time under prevailing U.S. law may have
dep ended up on wh ether the Court was applying state or federal law. See infra Part III.C.
61

Cf. Cornell, 250 F. at 963-64 (e xplain ing why no protectio n need be co nferred on descriptive terms). It is
possible that this obligation flowed from the de facto distinctiveness of the shape. However, the Court included the
“reaso nable efforts at differentiation” caveat separately in discussion of both the term’s ge nericity, see Kellogg, 305 U.S.
at 119, and the pillow-shap e, see id. at 120, and the factual analysis is combined after discussion of the protection of bo th
the shap e and the term. See id. at 120-21.
62
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119 (holding that the expiration of the patent conferred on the public the right to use the
“generic designation of the thing which has arisen during the monopoly in consequence of the designation having been
acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly, by accepting the b enefits of the monopoly, or exp ressly by his having so
connected the name with the machine as lend countenance to the resulting dedication.”).
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rooted in broader intellectual property policy. Thus, the Court suggested that “as Kellogg had the
right to make the article it also had the right to use the term by which the public knows it.”63
Protectablity of the term SHREDDED WHEAT thus appeared derivative, and intended to ensure the
commercial effectiveness, of the right to practice the expired patent on the pillow shape.64
III. After-Story: The Varied Use of Kellogg
As seen in Part II, although the Kellogg case involved a relatively narrow issue, and was in
large part controlled by the Court’s decision in Singer, Justice Brandeis’ opinion implicated a
number of central issues in trademark and unfair competition law. Most obviously, the opinion
contained language addressing distinctiveness, functionality, and the right to copy the subject matter
of expired patents. Less clearly, it spoke to the doctrine of “de facto secondary meaning” and, more
speculatively, the relationship between trademark law and broader principles of unfair competition.
But the perfunctory nature of some of the Court’s analysis, and the failure to address the relationship
between the different grounds of decision, left the opinion open to varied interpretation. As a result,
Kellogg has been used by Congress, courts, and scholars in a number of different ways.
A.

The Lanham Act

Kellogg had an immediate effect in Congress, and its hold over policymakers has continued
in successive revisions of the Lanham Act. Trademark law was in a state of ferment in 1938, when
Kellogg was decided. That year saw the publication of the first Restatement of Torts, which
addressed important principles of trademark and unfair competition law. And, although the
congressional gestation of the Trademark Act of 1946 can be traced back to 1924,65 it was in 1938
that Congressman Fritz Lanham introduced the first of the bills66 that would eventually lead to the
enactment of the Lanham Act. An intense debate ensued, as reflected both in legislative hearings
and in the pages of the leading trademark law journal, The Trademark Reporter.
The Department of Justice was an active participant in these debates. It was concerned that
a strengthening of trademark rights, as contemplated by the early (pre-Fritz Lanham) versions of
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See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 (citing Singer); see also id. (use of the name SHREDDE D W HEAT “was
essentially necessary to vest the public with the invention that became theirs on the expiry of the patent”).
64

The Court might, under this alternative rubric, have been articulating a rule of law that deems as “generic”
a term identifying a product on which a patent has expired. It is of course possible to reach a similar conclusion through
conventional doctrinal devices, na mely, by defining the relevant product market for distinctiveness purposes as the
market covered by the patented product. Language added to Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act in 1 984 may make this
hard to do as a matter of law.
65
See S. 2679, 68 th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1924). The bar associations were also extremely active in these efforts, and
stirrings in those bod ies can be seen as early as 1920 . See Edward S. Ro gers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function
of Trade-Marks, 14 LA W & C O N TE M P. P R O B . 173, 177 (19 49).
66

See H.R. 9041, 75 th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1938).
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trademark reform legislation, would have dire anti-competitive consequences.67 Explicit codification
of Singer/Kellogg was an important part of the Department’s agenda to ensure competition.68 In
particular, these cases were part of the discussion regarding what at the time were known as the
“patent clauses” of the pending legislation.69 Although there had been numerous “patent expiry”
trademark cases decided by lower courts since Singer, it may be that the decision of the Supreme
Court in Kellogg brought the Singer issue to the forefront of legislative consideration.70 The 1938
Lanham Bill, introduced prior to Kellogg, contained no provisions regarding products covered by
expired patents.71 Nor did legislative hearings on that bill address the topic. Yet, the 1939 bill
included a provision (Section 8) that would have caused a trademark registration of a term that was
the “sole name of an article . . . having patent protection” to expire two years after the expiration of
the patent, and this was the focus of some deliberation before Congress.72
During the evolution of the legislation, the patent expiry issue was dealt with instead by what
became Section 14(3) and 15(4) of the Lanham Act, which specifically addressed the trademark law
consequences of patent expiration by providing that a registration could be canceled “at any time if
the registered mark becomes the [generic] name of an article or substance on which the patent has
expired”73 and that no incontestable right could be acquired in a term that was the generic name of

67
See Sigmund Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, And the Restraint of Competition, 14 L A W & C O N TE M P.
P R O B . 323 , 360 (1949) (noting conc erns ab out early versions of the Lanham Act). Several aspects of the bill prompted
com plaints by the Department of Justice regarding the anticompe titive threats it pose d. See Rogers, supra note 65, at 183
(“Whenever there was a hearing before any committee on the trademark bill, sooner or later there appeared zealous men
from the Department of Justice who raised all sorts of objections”); see also Abraham S. Greenb erg, The “Patent”
Clauses of the Lanham Act, 38 T RADEMARK R EP . 3, 17-18 (1948) (noting role of Justice Department).
68

See Greenberg, supra note 67, at 13-14 (discussing views of representatives of the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade C ommission, and the Food and Drug Ad ministratio n); Timberg, supra note 6 7, at 35 3 (author with
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice).
69

See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 67.
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Edward S. Rogers, a leading practitioner and writer, was one of the driving forces behind the development
of the Lanham Act, see Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. R E V . 731, 755
(2003) (describing Rogers as the “father of the Lanham Act”), and represented Kellogg in the Nabisco litigation. See
National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 1937); 305 U.S. at 113 (on brief before the Supreme
Court). Twenty years earlier, Rogers had represented Quaker Oats against K ellogg in litigation over trad emark rights
in TO AST ED CO RN FLA KE S. See Kellogg Toa sted Corn Flake Co.v. Quaker O ats Co., 235 F. 657 (6 th Cir. 1916).
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See Gre enberg, supra note 67, at 4.
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Kellogg is not the only possible explanation for the appearan ce and discussion of this pro posal. The two-year
grace perio d ma y have b een insp ired by a parallel pro vision in the British Trademark Act of 193 8. See id. at 13 n.23.
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See Pub. L. No. 79-48 9, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
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an article that had been patented.74
In 1962, the italicized language in section 14(3) was deleted, transforming the Kelloggspecific provision into a general genericness provision.75 And in 1984, the gloss of Kellogg on the
genericness provision would be completed with the codification of Kellogg’s secondary meaning
language into the provision authorizing cancellation of registrations of marks that had become
generic. That year, Congress enacted the Trademark Clarification Act in response to a decision of
the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.76 The Ninth Circuit had
emphasized consumer motivation in assessing whether the term MONOPOLY for a board game was
generic, and thus held the term to be generic because a survey revealed that most purchasers wanted
the game MONOPOLY but did not care who made it. In reaching this conclusion, the court had
approvingly cited and adapted the Kellogg language to support the proposition that, to avoid
classification as a generic term, it must be shown that the “primary significance of the term in the
minds of the public is not the product but the producer.”77
The 1984 legislation effectively over-ruled Anti-Monopoly and amended Section 14(3) to
provide that “the primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than
purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the
74

Although the Kellogg Court found bo th the term SHRE DD ED W HE AT and the pillow shape of the b iscuits
to be generic and thus non-distinctive, the Court’s opinion was initially mo st influential am ong p olicymakers in
establishing the non-pro tectability of terms used in connection with a product upon which the patent had expired. One
might speculate that this was because the right to copy the shape was securely established by the right to copy and the
function ality doctrine. Although the Court’s discussion of the protection of the shape included a brief analysis of whether
the pillow shape was generic, the other grounds provided a m ore tha n ade quate basis upon which to deny p rotection.
In contra st, the ability to copy the term SHR EDD ED W HEA T was mo re heavily dependent upon the finding that the term
was generic.
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See Pub. L. No. 87-772. Neither the courts nor policymakers at the time of the Lanham Act appear to have
seen Kellogg as an opinion from which to extract a general test for determining whether a mark was generic (as opposed
to whether a word might be unprotected in the specific context of where the product with which it was associated was
covered by an expired patent). Yet, the seeds of that later development can perhaps be detected in contemporaneous
discussion of how the Singer/Kellogg doctrine could best be reflected in the statutory scheme of the Lanham Act. In
particular, the mutation of language from Kellogg into (eventually) the statutory standard for determining whether a mark
is generic might be traced to debate in the 1942 hearings on whether the general definition of “abandonment” in the
pending bill was sufficient to codify the “Shredded Wheat” case. Outside the context of products upon which a patent
had expire d, an attack on a ma rk on grounds o f genericness would prior to 1962 have relied on the abandonm ent
provision. See Statement of House Managers Regarding Conference Report on Lanham Trade-Mark Bill, quoted in
Greenberg, supra note 67, at 21-22. So me scho lars argued that it was not sufficient, and that a specific provision
regarding such a mark becoming generic was required.
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684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982). See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335.
The 1984 amendments were aimed primarily at rejecting reliance on consumer motivation as the determinant of whether
a mark was generic, rather than at stressing the need for a mark to show its primary significance was sourceidentification.
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See id. at 1319 (quoting Kellogg language and citing passage in prior decision in the case that had cited

Kellogg).
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generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”78 Although
Congress codified the “primary significance” language directly from Kellogg, it did not adopt the
formulation that the association be with “the producer, not the product.” That formulation, which
possibly captured the particular inquiry that the Court was pursuing in Kellogg, actually mis-states
broader trademark law, which does protect symbols that identify goods.79 Indeed, Congress also
added language to the same provision in 1984 to the effect that “a registered mark shall not be
deemed to be the generic name of goods or services solely because such mark is also used as a name
of or to identify a unique product or service.” Thus, although the Kellogg language regarding
secondary meaning has been partially codified by Congress, it has also been partially repudiated (at
least when divorced from the specific context in which it arose).
B.

The Courts

1.
Secondary Meaning. The language of the Kellogg opinion was also, not surprisingly,
immediately seized upon by lower courts as the prevailing legal standard for assessing secondary
meaning.80 However, many courts, replicating the mistakes of the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly
rather than the care of Congress in 1984, stressed the formulation of the Kellogg opinion that
secondary meaning existed only when the “primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer.”81 Indeed, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., the Supreme Court recently affirmed this language, originally from Kellogg, as the secondary
meaning standard.82 As Judge Helen Nies noted in her concurring opinion in In re D.C. Comics,83
the “truism that a trademark functions to indicate the source of goods, not the goods themselves . .
. cannot be applied as a mere legalism” but has to be applied with due attention to the purposes of
trademark law. That is, a trademark is furthering the goals of trademark law (and should thus be
protected) when it identifies one product and distinguishes it from another, even if the producer of
the goods is unknown. The truism, like the “producer, not product” language from Kellogg, reflects
efforts by courts to ensure that trademark law did not become a de facto product design law,
protecting the shape of all goods. As demonstrated in the context of generic marks, however, the
78
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See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of trademark); see also Statement of Michael A. Grow, Chairman, Federal
Legislation Committee, U.S. Trademark Association, Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Cop yrights &
Trademarks, of the Comm. on the Judiciary, S. Hrg. 98-901, Feb. 1, 1984, reprinted in J EROME G IL SO N , T RADEMARK
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See, e.g., Selchow & Righter Co. v. W estern Printing & Lithographing Co., 142 F.2d 7 07, 709 (7 th Cir. 1944);
American Fork & Hoe C o. v. Stampit Corp. 125 F.2d 47 2, 476 (6 th Cir. 1942).
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Labs., Inc. v. Ives, 456 U.S. 844 (19 82)).
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“producer, not the product” language that comprises the second half of the Kellogg test for secondary
meaning can be, and has been, misunderstood by later courts.
This danger is perhaps most acute when the language is applied outside the context in which
it arose in Kellogg. To be sure, Samara did involve product designs, namely, the design of
children’s seersucker clothing. Although the language still runs the risk of not perfectly capturing
the concept of secondary meaning, it arguably serves as a rough proxy in that context. But the
language of Kellogg came to drive distinctiveness analysis in cases well beyond the context of
product designs or patented products. It is still cited, and used, by courts as the basis for the general
standard for secondary meaning. 84 The danger is that, in these other contexts, it excludes marks that
do identify and differentiate a product even if the producer is unknown.
2.
Functionality. Although Kellogg involved rights claimed in a formerly patented
shape, the Court’s opinion has also been cited frequently in cases involving claims of rights in
product designs that were not the subject of an expired patent. Product design cases have
proliferated, especially under cover of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In these cases, Kellogg has
played two roles: it has both provided a foundation for the doctrinal development of the functionality
doctrine, and more broadly guided the development of the scope of protection of product design.
In the early years after the opinion, courts were unlikely to cite Kellogg as the source of doctrinal
functionality standards because the Restatement of Torts provided an adequate definition in Section
742.85 Instead, courts tended to rely on Kellogg for general support regarding the limited nature of
the protection to be afforded product shapes, perhaps detecting within the opinion hints of
overarching trademark policy as well as narrow doctrinal rules. These invocations of Kellogg were
made not only to support a denial of blanket injunctions against the copying of shapes, but also to
sustain arguments that some form of labeling or source-differentiation might be required of
defendants copying the shape of the plaintiff’s product.86
Over time, however, Kellogg has come to be cited as the foundation for the functionality
doctrine, even though the finding of functionality was arguably not critical to the Kellogg opinion.
The weight of the functionality ground in Kellogg was at best unclear, and the Court’s treatment of
the argument appeared almost incidental. However, the test for functionality endorsed by the current
Supreme Court with increasing certitude in a series of cases (Inwood, Qualitex, and TrafFix Devices)
purports, both by the Court’s initial reference in Inwood and by the received wisdom of lower courts,
84

Although one of the primary innovations of the Lanham Act was the federal registration of descriptive terms
that had acquired secondary meaning, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), the discussion of secondary meaning in Kellogg does not
appear to have generated much discussion either in the scholarly literature or congressional debate at the time.
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See R E S TA T EM E N T O F T ORTS § 74 2 (1938 ) (“A fea ture of good s is functional, . . . . if it affects their purpose,
action or performance, or the facility or econ omy o f processing, ha ndling or using them; it is non-functional if it does
not have any of such effects.”)
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Some courts in this period appear to have read Kellogg as requiring the same level of secondary meaning to
obtain an injunction or the limited relief of compelling a competitor to take affirmative steps to avoid confusion. See,
e.g., American Fork Co., 125 F.2d at 475.
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to have its roots in Kellogg.87 Although it is surely appropriate to include Kellogg as one of the cases
where a court was dissuaded from protecting a shape by virtue of its functionality, it is almost
impossible to determine from Brandeis’ opinion how the pillow shape was “essential to the use or
purpose of the article or. . . . affect[ed] the cost or quality of the article,” as the Court’s current test
would require.
3.
The Right to Copy the Subject-Matter of Expired Patents. In the immediate aftermath
of the case, scholars and policymakers primarily viewed the Kellogg decision as resting on the right
to copy previously announced by the Court in Singer.88 Although courts continue to cite Kellogg for
the right to copy a shape that was the subject matter of an expired patent, Kellogg does not provide
a comprehensive answer to the questions surrounding that right, because the scope of the right cannot
readily be deduced from the Court’s opinion. In particular, if a competitor has the “right to copy
what is covered by an expired patent”, what precisely does that right free for copying? Those parts
of the product covered by the claims of the patent? Those parts referenced in the specification?
Those parts of the product sold on the market during the term of the patent?89 The Kellogg Court,
like the Singer Court before it, included in its opinion several articulations of the right that might
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The etymo logy is co mplicated. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives, 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (“in general
terms, a pro duct feature is functional if it is essential to the use or pu rpose of the article or if its affects the co st or quality
of the article”) (citing Kellogg and Sears); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U .S. 159, 165 (199 5) (endorsing Inwood
test but adding the elaboration on Inwood – a feature is functional “if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors
at a significant non-reputatio n-related disadvantag e”); TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32-33 (reaffirming Inwood and
explaining that the elaboration from Qualitex would apply only if Inwood was not satisfied, and most likely only in cases
of “aesthetic functionality”). See also Valu Engineering Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(tracing functionality doctrine to Kellogg, and suggesting that that doctrine is grounded in concerns about end-runs on
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Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Pa ths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the W ay to
Sears, 61 W ASH . & L EE L. R EV . 79, 116 (2004) (suggesting that the TrafF ix Court has brought functionality closest to
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Objections to this view of Kellogg were voiced b y a lead ing scho lar. See W alter J. D erenb erg, Shredded
Wheat–The Still-Bo rn Trade -Mark, 34 B ulletin U.S. Trademark Association 68, Feb., 1939, cited in G reenb erg, supra
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Granting the defendant the right to make cereals in the pillow shape was necessary to effectuate the
unquestioned right to practice the expired patents. The patented machines were designed to produce only the pillowshaped biscuits, and thus the shape of the biscuits was d ictated by the p racticing of the expired patents. See Kellogg, 305
U.S. at 119; see also Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U .S. 169, 179 (189 6) (premising the right to make machines
in Singer’s distinctive configuration upon such configurations being the necessary result of practicing the expire d patents
on the component parts). It is not clear whether the Court intended this consideration to be a feature of any right to copy
analysis, and the brevity of the Court’s explanation for its conclusion left us without guidance.
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each suggest a different scope.90 These different articulations were likely not intended to supply a
rule of precise scope, and thus their significance is hard to gauge.
The Kellogg Court clearly recognized that the defendant’s right to copy emanates from the
expiry of the patent. But the dedication of an invention to the public upon patent expiry might be
grounded in a “patent bargain” theory, in concerns about the integrity of the patent system, or in the
concern that trademark protection for once-patented product designs might impair the competitive
climate.91 Each theory might generate a different answer to the question “what of the patented
product is dedicated to the public”? The closest the Kellogg court came to articulating a precise
theory behind the right to copy is to quote a passage from Singer that talked of the “conditions”
under which a patent was granted, suggesting an attachment to (some) patent bargain theory.92 But
Kellogg cannot with any certainty be cited in support of any statement of the scope of the right to
copy.
4.
The Relationship Between Functionality and the Right to Copy. Claims of
functionality often arise in tandem with invocations of the right to copy. In Kellogg, the Court
limited the protection available to Nabisco based upon both the functionality doctrine and the right
of Kellogg to copy the subject matter of Nabisco’s expired patent. However, Justice Brandeis did
not connect the existence or the expiry of the patent to the functionality analysis. Yet, modern
articulations of the functionality doctrine often do just that, and frequently cite Kellogg in the
process.
The existence and content of a utility patent are surely relevant to the functionality analysis.
Likewise, the expiry of a patent might be pertinent. However, because of the Kellogg Court’s failure
to elaborate upon the theoretical relationship (if any) between its functionality determination and the
right to copy, or to develop more fully a theory for the latter, the loose citation to Kellogg in modern
explanations of functionality has served only to complicate and obscure our understanding of the
90

See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 117 (“the product, the process, and the machinery employed in making it, had been
dedicated to the public”); id. (“there p assed to the public . . . the right to make the article as it was made during the patent
period”).
91

See Qua litex Co . v. Jaco bson Pro ds., 51 4 U .S. 15 9 (1995 ); see also Barrett, supra note 87.
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I say “some” patent bargain theory, because the detailed term s and cond itions of the bargain might remain
open to debate. B ut knowing that the right is gro unde d in the b argain would at least provide us with the relevant frame
of reference in which to have the discussion about “terms and conditions.” For example, it is unclear whether the right
to copy should extend to designs covered by invalidated patents. Invalidation might be viewed as a breach of contract
by the public in that the patentee is deprived of the benefit of its bargain. If the patentee entered into the bargain based
upon the representation of the public’s representative (the Patent Office) that exclusive rights would be available for the
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self-anticipation or delay by the patentee), then the right to copy might more equitably be recognized.
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scope of the right to copy and the relevance of patents (especially expired patents) in functionality
doctrine.
More recent Supreme Court decisions have done nothing to help. For example, in Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods.,93 the Court sought to explain the functionality doctrine in a case not
involving an expired patent, but in which the functionality doctrine might have been relevant to
satisfy competitiveness considerations (which were heightened by the possibility of registering colors
per se). The Court did so, however, in a fashion that served only to muddy the waters, blending
without elaboration Kellogg’s patent-based right to copy with competitiveness-based functionality
doctrine:
[T]he functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, . . .
after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional
features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could
be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended
forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity). See Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-120 (1938) (Brandeis, J.); . . . . Functionality
doctrine therefore would require, to take an imaginary example, that even if
customers have come to identify the special illumination-enhancing shape of a new
patented light bulb with a particular manufacturer, the manufacturer may not use that
shape as a trademark, for doing so, after the patent had expired, would impede
competition – not by protecting the reputation of the original bulb maker, but by
frustrating competitors’ legitimate efforts to produce an equivalent
illumination-enhancing bulb. See, e.g., Kellogg Co., supra, 305 U.S., at 119-120.
This articulation grounded functionality doctrine in a number of different policies – ensuring
free competition, the integrity or primacy of the (limited) patent system as the regime by which to
protect useful features, and effectuation of the patent bargain upon expiry of the patent. Kellogg is
cited twice, but for which proposition is unclear. (The pages of the Kellogg opinion that were cited
contain Justice Brandeis’ discussion of the right to copy; Kellogg’s functionality discussion appeared
on page 122 of the opinion in U.S. Reports).
Subsequently, in TrafFix Devices, the Court should have been forced to confront directly the
relationship between the right to copy an expired patent and functionality. In Traffix Devices, the
plaintiff sought to protect the shape (in particular, the dual-spring design) of a road sign on which
its utility patents had expired. The dual-spring design enabled the road sign to withstand the gusts
that would often blow on the open road. When a rival copied the dual-spring design after the expiry
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of the plaintiff’s patents, the plaintiff brought an action under trademark and unfair competition law.
The status of the right to copy as a defense standing independently of competition-based
functionality doctrine was placed front and center because the lower courts had held that rivals did
not need to copy the dual-spring design to compete, there being adequate alternative designs that
would perform the same function.
Formally, the Court took TrafFix to resolve the apparent split between the Tenth Circuit,
which in Vornado Air Circulation v. Duracraft had held that “[w]here a product configuration is a
significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade
dress protection,” and all other circuits, which had held that trade dress protection was not foreclosed
by the existence of a prior patent on the product design provided the trade dress was not functional.
But again this issue also raised the relationship of the right to copy and the functionality doctrine
because the Tenth Circuit in Vornado had found that the design of the product in that question (an
electric fan) was both distinctive and non-functional.94 Indeed, the Vornado opinion cited and relied
on Kellogg (and other Supreme Court cases).95
It was not surprising, therefore, that Kellogg was cited in almost every brief filed by the
parties and amici in TrafFix Devices and was the subject of discussion during oral argument. Yet,
the Supreme Court never even cited Kellogg in its opinion and thus declined the opportunity to
clarify the nature and scope of the right to copy.96 Instead, the Court held merely that if a design
feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article in question or affects the cost or quality of
the article” then that feature is functional, regardless of whether rivals need to copy the design in
order to compete or whether alternative designs were available. Moreover, the Court declared that
“[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional.” The Court did
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The Tenth C ircuit would not pe rmit the plaintiff to use trademark law to (in the court’s mind) extend the patent
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question that the Supreme Court in Kellogg had finessed by its finding that the shape was generic.
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See Transcript of Oral Argument in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing D isplays, Inc., 91 T RADEMARK R EP .
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not offer any consistent explanation of why (or which part of) the expired patent contributed to a
finding of functionality, such that we would know the scope of the right to copy and whether it
existed apart from broader functionality analysis.
In one sense, the Court is to be commended. It resisted the faulty argument of defendant’s
counsel, oft-repeated in product design litigation, that Kellogg provided the definitive answer to the
scope of the right to copy. By the same token, the holdings in TrafFix (together with the convoluted
explanations of functionality in Qualitex) create even greater uncertainty and further obscure
Kellogg. The Court has without any explanation intertwined the right to copy with the doctrine of
functionality, in a way that Justice Brandeis (however consciously) avoided.97 By failing to answer
the question on which it granted the petition for writ of certiorari, the Court placed in doubt one of
the more certain readings of Kellogg, namely, that there is some right (of admittedly uncertain
scope)98 to copy the subject matter of an expired patent that exists independently of competitiveness
(or other) concerns.99 Yet, at the same time, TrafFix unmoored functionality doctrine from questions
of competitiveness, which apparently informed both Kellogg and Cornell.
C. Intellectual Property Theory
To what does Kellogg owe its broad influence? The Kellogg opinion contained language that
canvassed numerous doctrines of trademark and unfair competition law, instantly creating potential
influence in a great number of cases. And the opinion contained sufficient ambiguity (in both
content and structure) that later courts and Congress could infuse it with further (perhaps incorrect)
significance. However, the significance of the opinion might also be because the case was about
more than trademark doctrine. To assess this possibility, we might consider the passions of Justice
Brandeis himself.
Why focus on Justice Brandeis? In 1938, Justice Brandeis was at the end of a glorious career
on the Supreme Court. He had offered to retire from the Court in 1937, but Chief Justice Hughes
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question of the scope of the right uncertain.
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persuaded him to remain on the Court.100 In fact, Brandeis wrote very few opinions during the 1937
and 1938 terms, and retired only three months after the Kellogg opinion was handed down, writing
only two opinions after Kellogg. Around the time Kellogg was decided, he was engaged in what he
deemed a far more significant activity, meeting privately with President Roosevelt to urge greater
U.S. involvement to protect Jews in Europe.101 Why, at this stage of his career, did he take an
interest in the Kellogg case?
From the outset of the opinion, it was clear that it was drafted for broader effect. The case
was decided only months after the Court decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,102 in which Swift v. Tyson
was over-ruled and Justice Brandeis’ majority opinion rejected the notion that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction had power to create federal common law. One might have thought,
therefore, that the Kellogg case would be decided under Delaware law. For example, because
Delaware had issued a state trademark registration on the term SHREDDED WHEAT, any doubts
that the Court harbored regarding the existence of consumer association surely would have to be
measured against that administrative assessment. Yet, in footnote 1 of the opinion, Justice Brandeis
accepted without question the parties’ assumption that the outcome would be the same under federal
and state law. In glossing over the important Erie question,103 an issue about which Justice Brandeis
campaigned hard on the Court for several years, the Justice may have sought to influence the
evolution of trademark and unfair competition law both philosophically and doctrinally at the federal
as well as at the state level.
At the philosophical level, Kellogg fed into a broader debate regarding the theoretical basis
of trademark and unfair competition law that was playing out in the courts, Congress, and in
scholarly literature at the time, and which is still sharply contested today. Brandeis’ opinion can be
seen as a repudiation of the philosophy of unfair competition law underlying the Court’s decision
twenty years earlier in International News Service v. Associated Press (INS).104 In INS, the Court’s
majority upheld a claim of unfair competition based upon the defendants’ misappropriation of noncopyrighted news stories published by the plaintiff.105 In expansive language that went beyond the
narrow holding of the case, the majority noted that the defendant was “endeavoring to reap where
it has not sown.” The Court explained that actions in unfair competition law were not limited to
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misrepresentation, but extended to cover acts of misappropriation.
Significantly, Justice Brandeis dissented in INS, unwilling to acknowledge property rights
absent explicit legislative instruction.106 For him, unfair competition consisted of misrepresentation:
“The fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor, and has a value for which
others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property.” Unfair
competition law required simply the restraint of conduct that would deceive the public into a
mistaken belief regarding the source of the product, and he found no such conduct in INS.107
Brandeis’ vision of unfair competition law as protection against misrepresentation and not
misappropriation finally secured the upper hand in Kellogg. Although Brandeis did not cite his INS
dissent in Kellogg, one could view Kellogg as vindication of the views that he expressed in INS.
That Nabisco had invested in the shredded wheat product did not give it control over the use of the
pillow shape (or the term SHREDDED WHEAT); it had no property right against misappropriation
of the shape after the expiry of the patents. Instead, Brandeis inquired whether Kellogg had engaged
in any acts of misrepresentation. The dissent in Kellogg made only one very short point, and it was
a view that Brandeis had unsuccessfully rebutted in INS: the cause of action should be sustained
because “Kellogg . . . is fraudulently seeking to appropriate to itself the benefits of a goodwill built
up at great cost by the respondent and its predecessors.”108
If INS was an iconic statement of the misappropriation model of unfair competition law,
Kellogg could be seen as a quiet but powerful plea for the misrepresentation model and a respect for
competition. As such, it was a significant marker in the broader theoretical debate about the role of
trademarks, and inevitably had implications for the debate that took place in Congress from 19381946 and in the courts thereafter. It was the philosophy underlying Brandeis’ opinion, as much as
the doctrinal language, that has attracted policymakers, advocates, and courts.
This hushed statement of philosophy has had a surprisingly pervasive effect in doctrinal
developments in a number of different fora. Brandeis’ implicit vision of intellectual property law
in Kellogg immediately attracted the attention of policymakers skeptical of broad misappropriationbased trademark rights and committed to aggressive regulation of the competitive environment.
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See 248 U.S. at 267 (Brandeis J., dissenting) (noting that courts were ill-equipped to determine the conditions
for the grant of a new right of property).
107

See id. at 258 (B randeis J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, who also dissented in INS, would have required the
crediting of Associated Pre ss as the source of the news stories.
108
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 123 (McReynolds J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit had also made much of the exp enditures of N abisco in de ciding to offer p rotection. See National B iscuit
Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 15 0, 153 (3d C ir. 1937).

29

Brandeis was a natural ally.109 He was an advocate of strong antitrust laws. He had helped to
establish the Federal Trade Commission on behalf of the Wilson Administration, and was
instrumental in the passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which remain pillars of U.S. antitrust
law.110 “He was greatly concerned about small competitors and the way they were treated in the
marketplace.”111
Although Kellogg hardly represented a “small competitor,” Brandeis’ basic concern about
competition may well have been piqued by the ongoing dispute between Nabisco and Kellogg,
especially as Washington debated the reform of trademark law. Certainly, pro-competition
policymakers were alert to what was going on at the Court. Affirmation, by Brandeis of all people,
of a misrepresentation model of trademark law in the midst of a growing legislative debate that
implicated the basic philosophical choice inevitably would have been seized upon. Thus,
representatives of the Department of Justice, seeking to curtail the expansion of protection in the
Lanham Act as discussed above, later identified Kellogg as an example of “the more conservative
school of trade-mark protection . . . which considers the trade-mark’s sole function to be that of
indicating source of origin . . . [rather] than those which would claim for the trade-mark a more farreaching significance as the conservator of independent property rights . . .”112
And the Brandeis-inspired Department of Justice did secure what they regarded as important
gains in the final version of the Lanham Act.113 For example, the 1938 Lanham bill proposed that
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descriptive marks could be federally registered upon proof of secondary meaning. Of course,
descriptive marks were already protected in similar circumstances under principles of unfair
competition. However, the proposal also introduced the notion of incontestability, under which five
years after registration, trademark owners could ensure quiet(er) title. In particular, marks covered
by incontestable registrations could not be challenged on the ground that they were descriptive.
These proposals to change the nature and scope of trademark rights were among the reasons that led
the Department of Justice initially to oppose the Lanham Act’s reforms on the grounds that they were
anti-competitive.114 The disagreement reflected in part a philosophical divide about the conceptual
identity of trademark law. Although, in order to prevail in an infringement action, the owner of an
incontestable mark would still be required to show a likelihood of confusion,115 this was a first step
toward a model of trademark law that appeared more “property-like” and contrary to the vision
underlying Brandeis’ opinion. The Department’s concerns led to the inclusion in the Lanham Act
of provisions creating an “antitrust defense” to incontestability, 116 and granting the Federal Trade
Commission the power to petition for cancellation of a trademark registration.117
Brandeis’ equivocation in footnote 1 regarding the application of state or federal law might
also have been a more direct attempt to extend the doctrinal influence of Kellogg to the core of INS.
INS was clearly a federal common law decision, and thus Erie alone effected its evisceration. But
by suggesting that the same result would pertain in Kellogg under federal common law, Brandeis
ensured that Kellogg’s anti-misappropriation counter to INS might gain traction in the courts as
something other than a mere statement of Delaware law. As a result, the approach of Brandeis in
Kellogg has shaped (sometimes without explicit acknowledgment) protection available to data under
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state common law misappropriation doctrines developed by federal courts,118 common law trade
dress protection sought under the federal unfair competition provision of Section 43(a),119 and more
conceptually ambiguous claims brought under the “false designation of origin” language of that
statutory provision.120 In 1938, the resuscitation of federal unfair competition law, let alone in the
form endorsed in INS, may have seemed unlikely. But the force of Brandeis’ philosophy, perhaps
buttressed by his decision to characterize the case more broadly than an application of Delaware law,
has ensured that Kellogg, at least, remains a vital marker in the development of modern trademark
and unfair competition law.121
Conclusion
Kellogg is a somewhat rare Supreme Court opinion; its correctness has never really been
questioned. But because a variety of rationales were offered by the Court for a conclusion upon
which most would agree, the precise scope of the opinion has never been fully clear. This has
allowed the opinion to achieve significance, both judicially and legislatively, well beyond the narrow
context of the type of case the Court was deciding. But the (perhaps purposeful) ambiguities that
remained might also have prevented the opinion contributing to the clear development of areas of
law that were directly addressed by the Kellogg Court. This partially explains the irony that the
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current Supreme Court has cited Kellogg in a number of trademark cases for a series of different
propositions (e.g., regarding secondary meaning, or functionality), but did not cite the case in the
most recent effort to tackle the very question at issue in Kellogg (the scope of trademark protection
for a product covered by an expired patent).
By the same token, however, Justice Brandeis’ quiet efforts to supply a more fundamental
(and long-term) statement about the philosophy of trademark and unfair competition law may have
been far more influential than a narrow application of existing law might have been. And those
efforts to articulate a philosophy for trademark and unfair competition law, which do not spring as
obviously from the text of the Kellogg opinion, but instead are more readily apparent from historical
context, may also be important in the years ahead as scholars and policymakers consider whether
trademark law has inappropriately become a law against misappropriation.
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